All the eleven commentators raise relevant and interesting issues that will eventually have to be dealt with by a research program in which synchronic patterns are explained with reference to something akin to diachronic adaptation.
1 I have to restrict myself to a few comments on some of the key issues.
Are grammatical patterns functionally motivated?
The majority of commentators agree that the answer to the question in the heading is basically yes, but Haider, Müller, Newmeyer, and Dresher & Idsardi do not. This question needs to be addressed first, because the whole issue of adaptation arises only if one recognizes the functional motivation behind much of grammatical patterning. I think that it is undeniable that Optimality Theory has greatly reduced the prominence of non-functional patterns even within generative grammar. Most constraints belong to the markedness and faithfulness families, and these simply make sense functionally. Highly unnatural rules such as "k s" (electricity) seem to have disappeared from the agenda since the advent of OT. And some prominent OT practitioners are interested in further explanation of the constraints. 2 This makes it harder to argue against functional motivation, but some commentators still do just that.
1 Dr edier A Idsardi seem to misunderstand the main point of the target article, because they criticize me for falling short of "demonstrating that adaptation is the major force behind language change". My point was the opposite, in a sense: that language change is the major force behind adaptation. Still, most of what they say is relevant in one way or another to what I said.
2 For example, Kager (1999: 11) requires a functional justification of newly posited constraints: "Phonological markedness constraints should be phonetically grounded in some property of articulation or perception."
The least interesting rhetorical point that both Haid» and Müller make is that functional explanations appeal to common sense. Yes, sometimes they are compatible with it, but it so happens that common sense sometimes coincides with the truth. More to the point is Haider's negative argument that "there is no independent theory of cognitive processing which would tell us whether a particular expression E is cognitively more easy or more difficult to process", but this is too easy a dismissal of decades of sophisticated phonetic and psycholinguistic research. Müller's strategy is far more effective: He actually cites relevant psycholinguistic research, and if this research were representative, then I might indeed be persuaded to change my mind. What linguistics needs is precisely this: A confrontation of posited grammatical patterns with all kinds of systemexternal evidence, rather than the simple assumption that the most elegant formal principles are innate.
Haider also criticizes the notion of adaptation as "serving the user's needs", but I know nobody who has proposed such a definition of adaptation. Rather, a pattern is adaptive if it shows clear evidence of good design. A stone can serve the need of a user who wants to drive a nail into a wall, but only a hammer is adapted to this need and shows good design. Languages resemble hammers, not stones. Müller rightly notes that functional explanations run the risk of being post hoc and arbitrary, but I cannot see why this should be a greater problem for functionalist analyses than for, say, generative analyses.
Newmeyer is worried that the functionalist position is undermined if only 30 % of all language changes are functionally motivated. He cites little more than impressionistic observations in support of such a possibility, but Croft's suggestion that functionally adaptive changes are characteristic only of large, high-contact, loose-knit societies is extremely interesting and highly relevant. If this were true, then the role of functional adaptation in explaining grammar would indeed be smaller than I envisaged them. At present, this seems unlikely to me, but of course this is an empirical issue that functionalist research needs to address urgently.
Assumptions of Optimality Theory
Several authors criticize some of the basic tenets of OT, and I should stress here that I am in no way advocating this particular framework. I merely note that OT has made a rapprochement between generative and functional linguistics easier by directing attention to the functionally motivated aspects of grammatical structure (this is also stressed by Minkova). I fully agree with Haider's criticism that OT has no constraints on constraints (although I think that such constraints are at least implicitly observed by good OT analysts). I agree with Dahl that the identification of the input for OT evaluations is a huge problem, 3 and that it is Some issues concerning optimally and diachronic adaptation 253 questionable whether all synchronic patterns can be described insightfully by constraint ranking. Newmeyer highlights the fact that we sometimes seem to get different construction-specific rankings of constraints within a single language. 4 Traugott reminds us that many patterns look like "junk" from a synchronic perspective and seem to be due to some kind of inertia, i.e. speakers' preference for conservatism. It is hard to see how they could be captured by universal constraints. Other well-known problems of OT are that it has no straightforward way of dealing with optionality and absolute ungrammatically. So I basically agree with Newmeyer that we still need the parochial rules of earlier generative grammar, or the analogous constructions and schémas of usage-based models of grammar. In my view, the task of description should not be confused with that of explanation: Our descriptions should incorporate generalizations only where we have positive evidence that speakers actually make these generalizations. That grammatical structures as described in this way are not arbitrary is then captured by system-external functional explanations. What OT is trying to do (in line with a long generative tradition) is to build these functional explanations directly into the grammatical description. While this strategy often yields more elegant descriptions, I have serious doubts that it can be a general solution. The fact that OT has lost the ability to do some things that were easily handled in earlier frameworks (optionality, absolute ungrammaticality) should be a warning. Merely redesigning the descriptive machinery often entails as many losses as gains. True understanding requires reduction ("good reduction", as Minkova points out) to some independent domain, for instance language use.
Variation and selection
If grammatical patterns indeed show a non-accidental resemblance to the patterns of language use, then it is difficult to see how this could be explained without invoking some kind of evolutionary or invisible-hand process. It is true, 3 The theory of diachronic adaptation and OT would be the most easily comparable if the input in constraint tableaux always represented a real earlier stage of the language. The input for cats [luets] 4 Similarly, Raffelsiefen (1996) assumes different constraint rankings for different English affixes. Actually, if one grants affixes independent existence in the lexicon, it is not too problematic to assume that they should be associated with their own constraint rankings. Similarly, in a construction-based model where constructions are listed as separate entities, each of them could be associated with different constraint rankings. I doubt, however, that currently anyone would be prepared to defend this position.
however, that it is not obvious to what extent this process is analogous to biological evolution with its interplay of random genetic variation and environmental selection. So I agree with those commentators who point to open questions in this area. As TVaugott notes, we have no conclusive answers to some basic questions regarding language change, such as what motivates innovation, and who originates change and who passes it on. Many linguists still think that most innovation originates in language acquisition (as Dresher & Idsardi seem to do), a view that I do not share. Needless to say, I do not have new answers to all these big questions, but I feel that work on diachronic change would profit if it addressed more directly the question of whether "language change is language improvement" (Vennemann 1993) . Dresher & Idsardi's remark concerning final devoicing illustrates the pitfalls of ignoring functional explanations: These authors seem to say that devoicing and revoicing in coda position are mere random oscillations without any adaptive significance. But the phonetic preference for final devoicing is well-understood, and as expected, there are no phonological changes involving voicing in coda position. The loss of final devoicing in Yiddish is clearly morphologically adaptive, because it occurred only when it led to greater morpheme uniformity ("paradigm leveling"). 5 Dahl remarks that the explanatory role of variation is undermined if the source of variation is non-random. Croft goes much further by claiming that all functionally adaptive patterns are due to functionally motivated innovations, not to selection. These are important questions to which I have no complete answer. For many changes, it is probably true that the adaptive nature derives entirely from the innovations (e.g. final devoicing), so that the additional mechanism of functional selection could be dispensed with. But I am not sure that this works for all cases. Consider the case of article-possessor complementarity (the book, my book, *my the book), which I have argued is explained by economic motivation: Since possessed NPs are very likely to be definite, the definite article is redundant, and this redundancy is exploited by some languages (cf. Haspelmath 1999) . In older Germanic, the grammaticalization of the definite article was only in its beginning stages, and the occurrence of the article was highly variable: book, the book, my book, and the my book were all possible. As the pattern became more fixed, some of the variation was eliminated by some kind of selection process, so that now only the book and my book are possible.
5 Dresher & Idsardi seem to be unaware of the classic functionalist way of dealing with conflicts between phonological and morphological preferences, otherwise they would not mention ''increasing opacity" as a problematic case for the functional approach. Increasing opacity indeed creates difficulties and violates morphological preferences, but it is usually well-motivated phonologically. So opacity is good for pronunciation but bad for morphology, while analogical leveling ("restructuring") is good for morphology and sometimes bad for pronunciation. The old generative idea of rule addition to the end of the grammar, as still invoked by Dresher & Idsardi, is far less principled. (Why not rule addition to the beginning of the grammar? Why not rule subtraction?)
What kind of functionally-driven innovation might be held responsible for the elimination of the less economical variant the my book? It seems to me that in such cases where the source of variation (grammaticalization in its early stages) is not identical to the functional motivation (utterance economy), the concept "functional selection" still has an important role to play.
What's In performance, what's in grammar, what's innate?
It is very important to separate at least conceptually the three domains of performance (or language use, or Ε-language), grammar (or conventional patterns, or competence, or I-language), and innate structures (or "Universal Grammar") 0 . Functionalists sometimes rhetorically reject the performance/ grammar distinction, but keeping them separate really seems to be a conceptual necessity. So the question is usually not whether a pattern exists as a conventional grammatical entity, but merely whether it is functionally motivated. When Dresher & Idsardi argue that a certain phonological principle "does not emerge from phonetic factors such as articulatory effort", they attack a strawman: Nobody really denies that competence patterns exist, but functionalists claim that linguistic analysis does not stop there. Grammatical patterns do not "emerge directly", but arise in some non-trivial fashion that should be the object of serious linguistic research (and in my view, diachronic adaptation is the key concept here).
However, I was somewhat surprised to see Wurzel assert "that 'grammatical' optimality is identical to 'user' optimality." This would seem to indicate that Wurzel does not distinguish between grammatical patterns and language use, but I am sure that there is a misunderstanding here. Similarly confusing is Wurzel's quotation from David Stampe, who describes a phonological process as "a mental operation that applies in speech...". This seems implausible initially if taken literally, but eventually I am confident that Stampe, too, must have an equivalent of the competence/performance distinction.
More difficult is the question of which grammatical structures are innate. Universality is a necessary prerequisite for innateness, but not a sufficient condition, because most of the relevant factors affecting language use are universal as well. Generative grammarians have had a tendency to attribute as much as possible to an innate UG; an instance of this general tendency is Dresher & Idsardi's suggestion that what prevents codas from having more than one phonologically distinctive voicing gesture (thus ruling out *[kaetz]) is a principle of UG. Since this constraint is eminently reasonable from a usage-based point of view, I find the assumption that UG is not involved much more plausible.
Functionalists, by contrast, have tended to minimize the contribution of innate patterns. Kirby focuses on this opposite bias and asks: "Why should be assume that the domain of I-language is a blank slate onto which any useful constraints can be written?" Linguists who are not impressed by the argument from the poverty of the stimulus would probably answer: Because this is the null hypothesis. But Kirby's example from parsing difficulty and word order in ditransitive clauses shows nicely that not all useful performance constraints seem to be possible as grammatical constraints. An even more impressive demonstration that performance factors cannot explain everything can be found in Hayes (1999:248-53) , where it is shown that phonological systems exhibit a tendency toward symmetry that cannot be attributed to functional motivations. But far too little attention has been devoted to these issues, because generative linguists have been much too quick to derive observed universal patterns from the architecture of their grammatical models (thereby attributing them to UG), without even asking whether the patterns might instead be explainable in functional terms.
Adaptive and counter-adaptive changes
TVaugott and Dahl raise the question of those changes that are not adaptive, in particular grammaticalization, which I suggested (in note 10) is "a kind of inflationary counter-adaptive process". Since grammaticalization accounts for so much of diachronic change, Traugott is worried that this undermines my whole enterprise. She then asks: "Under what understanding of adaptation is it reasonable to exclude [grammaticalization] from the kinds of phenomena that should be accounted for?"
In the article I did not express a strong opinion on whether grammaticalization changes are adaptive or not. My reason for describing grammaticalizaation as counter-adaptive is that very often a new grammatical category simply seems to supplant an earlier one, without any change of the design quality. For instance, the French compound past (/' ai acheté Ί bought') superseded the older simple past (/' achet-ai), the periphrastic comparative forms {plusfort 'stronger') replaced the Latin affixal comparatives (fort-ior), the -wien/-adverbs (forte-ment 'strongly') replaced the Latin -ifer-adverbs (fort-iter) y and so on. Bybee et al. (1994: 298) also prefer a "mechanistic" view of grammaticalization to an adaptive one:
Some issues concerning optimality and diachronic adaptation 257 "Further evidence against the functionalist teleology is the ironical fact that efforts to be more concrete and specific lead to the loss of specific concrete components of meaning in grammaticization... For instance, if a verb formerly meaning 'want* is now used for intention or prediction, then speakers must choose another verb with a more specific meaning of 'want' if that is what they mean to express." However, while grammaticalization does not seem to be adaptively motivated, it may well have adaptive consequences, and the way it proceeds may be constrained functionally. Take the example of the English comparative: Here, too, the recently gramma ti calized periphrastic comparative is widespread (e.g. more beautiful), but many adjectives only allow the affixed comparative (e.g. warm-er). The distribution of the periphrastic and the affixed comparative is clearly functionally motivated: Affixal comparatives are allowed only when a prosodically well-designed word results. So the grammaticalization has led to an adaptive pattern, although initially the process was not motivated by adaptation.
Traugott further observes that grammaticalization often introduces "important functional categories" into a language. But how important these functional categories are may be questioned, because for every functional category there are many languages that get by without it. So Dahl has a point when he critically notes that one of my adaptive accounts (the obligatoriness of subject pronouns in languages with rich agreement) seems to assume an adaptive motivation of grammaticalization. But on the other hand, there are no languages that lack functional categories entirely, so it would be surprising if functional categories turned out to be non-adaptive, purely mechanical structures. I acknowledge that this is a difficult problem area that needs much further scrutiny.
The biologica] analogy
Itkooen criticizes me for basing my claims about diachronic adaptation on the analogy with change in biology, and Wurzel similarly dismisses the "biological paradigm" as "nothing more than decorative padding". Of course, the comparison with biological adaptation is not crucial to my proposal, but I do think that it helps me make my central points. I fully agree with Itkonen that there are important disanalogies between biological adaptation and linguistic diachronic adaptation. Yes, there is "an application of intelligence in linguistic change which is absent in biological evolution", but I do not agree that "this suffices to make the two domains totally disanalogous". There are still important analogies left, and the real question is whether these analogies are fruitful enough to be worth exploiting. Croft goes so far as to advocate a "generalized theory of selection" of which biological and linguistic selection are just special cases, and I think not even Itkonen would disagree that such a generalized theory is at least possible.
For me, the main attraction of biological adaptation as an analogy to linguistics is that I see strong evidence for good design both in biological organisms and in language structure. Biologists have been blessed with a powerful theory for explaining such good design, and it seems to me that linguists can still learn from the biologists' success. Many linguists still find good design in language structure so mysterious that they continue to ignore the accumulating evidence for it, 7 or continue to attribute adapted grammatical patterns directly to speakers' intentions. Biological evolution shows that good design without an intentional designer need not be mysterious.
Moreover, the cross-fertilization between linguistics and biology is by no means a new fashion. Hermann Paul (cited by Wurzel) and his neo grammarian contemporaries were profoundly influenced by a Zeitgeist that rejected Hegelian idealism and romantic collectivism in favor of an individualism, materialism and uniformitarianism that shared much with (and probably owed much to) Darwin's reconceptualization of biological change. And conversely, Darwin and the early Darwinians often appealed to the analogy with linguistic evolution (cf. Alter 1999 for a recent account).
Itkonen suggests that the biological analogy may also be motivated by the higher prestige of biology. This suspicion is difficult to counter, especially since such factors also work unconsciously. But I would say that biology has simply been more successful than linguistics, so it is natural that linguists should look to biology for enlightenment.
8 Moreover, if prestige were one's main driving force, one should try to be inspired by genetics rather than evolutionary biology, or for that matter, by physics or chaos theory (cf. Lightfoot 1999).
On the novelty of my proposals
Some commentators question whether what I have to say is really new. In particular, both Minkova and Wurzel mention Hayes (1999) , an important paper on "phonetically-driven phonology" that gives the OT constraints a basically functionalist interpretation. Hayes explicitly says that he is a functionalist in 7 As a striking example, consider the fact that Hawkins's (1994) sophisticated and detailed work on the performance factors behind word order patterns has been completely ignored by generative syntacticians.
8 Before Darwin developed his theory of descent with modification, linguistics was more successful than biology in that it established the fact of evolution and the details of family trees earlier than biology, so that it was natural that biologists paid more attention to linguistics. (Or was the real reason that linguistics was more prestigious in the 19th century?) Some issues concerning optimality and diachronic adaptation 259 that he believes that "the formal system of grammar characteristically reflects principles of good design" (p. 276). This is an unusual statement for a generativist, but it still seems to me that the more mainstream OT view is the anti-functional stance articulated by Mulkr (although phonologists and syntacticians probably differ significantly in their views). In any event, Minkova's and Wurzel's point is well-taken, and if I had known Hayes's brilliant paper when I wrote the target article, I would have written it differently.
Wurzel stresses that much of what I say is already found in Natural Morphology and Natural Phonology, and indeed in Hermann Paul's writings. I cannot deny this, and it is no secret that I have been profoundly influenced by these approaches. I agree with Wurzel that Paul's insistence on the diachronic perspective cannot be interpreted as betraying a simple lack of interest in synchronic grammatical structures. Paul knew that the true explanatory factors are in diachrony, but he did not, as far as I know, directly address the question of how functional preferences in speech come to be reflected in conventional patterns.
This question, called "the problem of linkage" by Kirby (1999:19) , has very rarely been addressed directly by functionalists, including Natural Morphologists. It may be an exaggeration to speak of "the biggest flaw in the functional approach" (Kirby 1999:19) , because it is more a lacuna than an error, but sometimes functionalists' formulations are indeed misleading. For instance, Dressier (1990:76) writes about his approach (Natural Phonology/Natural Morphology):
"It is assumed that both linguistic uni versais and all language systems have the teleology of overcoming substantial difficulties of language performance (including storage/memorization, retrieval, evaluation) for the purpose of the two basic functions of language: the communicative and the cognitive function." Bybee (1999:212) concludes from this statement that Dressier attributes goal-oriented behavior to language systems, and even makes the generalization that this teieological approach is characteristic of European functionalism. I am sure that Bybee misinterprets Dressier, but his formulations invite such a misinterpretation. And Dressier is not an isolated case: Functionalists have not focused sufficiently on the "problem of linkage", and they should be careful to avoid teieological ways of speaking until there is a generally recognized solution for this problem.
Martin Haspelmath

On how questions and why questions
Müller ends his comments with a call for modesty: "Given the lack of decisive evidence, my conclusion is that, for the time being, the (generative) grammarian is well advised to concentrate on how questions, and postpone why questions until our understanding of cognitive issues has deepened, and these questions can be answered (or even asked) properly." I completely agree that modesty is a virtue, and perhaps linguists have a dangerous tendency to be overambitious. This also applies to genera ti vis ts, who have advanced their approach as a solution to "Plato's Problem", or have speculated on whether the language faculty is "perfect".
But what I want to question here is whether it is a good strategy to defer why questions and concentrate on how questions in isolation. I believe that the answer to how questions often depends on the answer to why questions, i.e. that description is not independent of explanation.
Consider the issue of whether noun phrases contain a determiner position which can be filled only once and therefore accounts for article-possessor complementarity (*the my book). Henry Sweet modestly noted this cooccurrence restriction in his 1898 grammar of English, and added a brief speculation about an explanation:
"Nouns qualified by a genitive do not take the articles ..., evidently because the preceding genitive is felt to define them enough by itself (Sweet 1898:64) Throughout the 20th century, structural and generative syntacticians have defended a very different analysis in terms of a single determiner position, which builds the explanation, so to speak, into the description. Now it turns out that as more languages are considered, the determiner-position analysis is not general enough, and only a functional economy-based explanation makes the right predictions about the distribution of articles and possessors (Haspelmath 1999) . The determiner category now seems redundant and indeed questionable. The postulation of a structural determiner position may well have been an overambitious step in the wrong direction that would have been avoided if syntacticians had paid enough attention to the why question. This is a small simple example, but it seems to me that it nicely illustrates the dangers of limiting oneself to how questions.
